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I. INTRODUCTION
On Thanksgiving Day 1997, Greg and Luann Bertaux were traveling
from their Kansas home to Eureka Springs, Arkansas, when they observed
a nearby green minivan darting dangerously in and out of traffic along U.S.
71 near Carthage, Missouri.' Thinking that the driver was inebriated, Mrs.
Bertaux picked up her cellular phone and dialed 911 to alert Missouri
police.2 Her call succeeded in reaching the Joplin Police Department, but
shortly after connecting, a recorded message instructed her to hold for an
3
attendant who never answered the phone. Bertaux tired of waiting for an
operator in Joplin and dialed information in an attempt to learn the phone
number for an approaching town's police department.4 Again, she failed to
reach the proper authorities. Her third attempt to alert emergency
personnel of the minivan's dangerous driver finally reached local police
officers. By the time officials could set up a roadblock, however, the green
minivan had already smashed head-on with another automobile and killed
6three people, including a two-year-old child.
Sadly, had Mrs. Bertaux reached Missouri police on her first attempt,
7these deaths might have been avoided. Yet neither the Bertaux couple nor
the majority of Missourians surveyed at that time were aware that "*55"
was the official cellular number to dial in that state for emergency
assistance-not "911"!' This avoidable tragedy was but one of the more
significant considerations driving Missouri Congressman Roy Blunt and
Congresswoman Pat Danner's push for legislation to establish 911 as the
1. Travelers with Cellular Phone Unable to Prevent Collision That Killed Three, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1997, at C4. See also 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9861 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement ofRep. Danner).
2. Travelers with Cellular Phone Unable to Prevent Collision That Killed Three,





7. See 145 CONG. REC. H9858, supra note 1, at 9861.
8. Lori Winter & Chris Hoag-Apel, A Ballot Proposition That Will Save Lives, ST.
LouIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1999, at B7. In 1999, over twenty different wireless
emergency numbers were used in the United States, such as "Star 999" in Illinois and "Star
DUI" in Ohio. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 2 (1999).
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nationwide telephone number for emergency assistance. 9 Members of both
the House and the Senate drafted similar measures to accomplish this
objective during the 106th Congress, and Senators John McCain of Arizona
and Conrad Bums of Montana introduced the bill that eventually became
the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 (the 911 Act)
on April 14, 1999.0 After the House approved the Senate's version of the
Act by a vote of 424-2, President Clinton signed the measure into law on
October 26, 1999."
Designed to promote the prompt deployment of a seamless
emergency services infrastructure to meet the nation's safety needs, the 911
Act not only instructs the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
to assign the abbreviated dialing code 911 for use as the universal
emergency telephone number, but also directs the FCC to establish
appropriate transition periods for compliance in areas without 911 service.
Furthermore, the 911 Act supports individual states' efforts to develop
comprehensive emergency communications.1 2 Although improving the 911
system and saving lives by developing an end-to-end emergency
communications network are commendable goals, this Note argues that the
anemic 911 Act is an important first step, but accomplishes little beyond
merely establishing 911 as the universal emergency telephone number. Part
II of this Note addresses the history and background of the 911 calling
system while Part I presents, in detail, the Act itself. Part IV evaluates the
911 Act's potential ability to meet the nation's safety needs in light of its
weaknesses. Finally, Part V asserts the specific changes and improvements
needed for the 911 Act to adhere to its promise of enhanced public safety.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF 911 TECHNOLOGY
Great Britain developed the first three-digit emergency telephone
number in 1937 to provide its citizens with an avenue to notify the
appropriate authorities quickly and easily in an emergency.' 3 At the urging
9. See Winter & Hoag-Apel, supra note 8, at B7. Rep. Blunt co-sponsored H.R. 438,
the House of Representative's version of the Wireless Communications and Public Safety
Act of 1999. See H.R. 438, 106th Cong. (1999). In March 1997, Rep. Danner introduced
legislation to standardize state cellular emergency numbers. See 145 CONG. REc. H9858,
9861 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Danner).
10. See generally H.R. 438, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 800, 106th Cong. (1999); S. REP.
No. 106-138, at 3 (1999).
11. Chuck Holt, 911 Legislation Becomes Law-Finally, WRELESS REV., November
15, 1999, at 12.
12. Implementation of 911 Act, Fourth Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 17079, par. 1, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 489 (2000) [hereinafter
911 Act Report and Order].
13. Betram A. Maas, Comment, "911" Emergency Assistance Call Systems: Should
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of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement, AT&T pioneered the
United States' 911 system in the late 1960s and employed it in Haleyville,
Alabama. 14  With help from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, other local governments and municipalities soon followed
Haleyville's lead, and today some configuration of 911 service is available
on more than eighty-nine percent of the nation's wirelines.' 5 Picking up the
telephone is now most Americans' first instinct when faced with an
emergency as 911 has become synonymous with emergency assistance.
6
A 911 emergency system includes two fundamental components: (1)
Public Safety Answering Points ("PSAPs") replete with the personnel and
equipment necessary to receive 911 calls; and (2) switching and signaling
equipment provided by telecommunications carriers that recognizes the 911
abbreviated dialing code and relays emergency calls to the PSAPs.'7 Local
exchange carriers ("LECs") route the typical 911 emergency call to
centrally located PSAPs staffed by trained, professional operators who help
callers in need of assistance and convey details of the caller's situation to
Local Governments Be Liable for Negligent Failure to Respond?, 8 GEO. MASON U. L. REv.
103, 103 n.1 (1985).
14. Id.; see also 911 Act Report and Order, supra note 12, para. 9. The Alabama
Speaker of the House, Rankin Fite, made the first 911 call on February 16, 1968 from a
room in the Haleyville city hall. The call was answered by Congressman Tom Bevill on a
bright red telephone located in the police department. See also Alabama Chapter of NENA,
World's First 911 Call, at http://www.al911.org/first-call.htm (last updated Sept. 12, 2001).
15. T.J. Yung and B.K. Yamaoka, A National Directory of 911 Systems, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 1 (1980); Revision of the Commission's Rules
to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 9 F.C.C.R. 6170, para. 3 (1994) [hereinafter E-911 Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking]. Although this statistic is seven years old, not all American
communities have put 911 service into effect yet. While many localities have implemented
access via 911 to a PSAP, "[o]n the opposite end of the spectrum, some communities may
not use 911 or any other abbreviated dialing code, may not have PSAPs in place, and may
provide access to ... emergency services by dialing a seven or ten-digit telephone number."
Implementation of 911 Act; the Use of Nil Codes and Other Abbreviated Dialing
Arrangements; Compatibility with 911 Emergency Calling Systems, 65 Fed. Reg. 56752,
56752 (Sept. 19, 2000) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 20) [hereinafter 911 Act Proposed
Rules]. For the purposes of this Note, "wireline" refers to the traditional, nonmobile form of
telephone service offered by Local Exchange Carriers.
16. See 911 Act Report and Order, supra note 12, para. 3; Revision of the
Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.RI
18676, para. 3, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 967 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 FCC Report]. In fact,
Congress declared September 11 as National 911 Day in 1987. 12th Annual 911 Day
Celebrates Final Congressional Push For 911 Throughout United States; House and Senate
Provide Overwhelming Bipartisan Support to Improve 911 Emergency Response to Over 70
Million Wireless Telephone Users, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 10, 1999.
17. 911 Act Proposed Rules, supra note 15, para. 3.
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the appropriate emergency personnel.'8
Traditionally, the emergency operator receiving the 911 call at the
PSAP gathered information about the nature and location of the emergency
by asking the caller precise questions.19 Interrogating callers wastes
valuable time as more states and municipalities have upgraded their 911
systems and PSAPs to enhanced 911 ("E-911") over the past decade.20 A
wireline 911 call placed today in a region with E-911 capability transmits
both the caller's telephone number and address to the PSAP. This
capability allows the operator to relay that information to emergency
personnel quickly and enables emergency crews to respond rapidly, even if
21
a caller cannot convey his or her location.
Not all 911 calls, however, are placed from wireline telephones;
wireless 911 is becoming increasingly crucial in alerting public safety
agencies to an emergency. 2 In 1999, when Congress passed the 911 Act,
roughly 68 million Americans subscribed to a wireless telephone service.
3
These subscribers placed 43 million wireless 911 calls that year-double
the amount of similar calls made in 1996-and in 2001, experts predict that
the total number of cellular calls placed in the United States will exceed all
24
wireline calls. PSAPs are inundated with more than eighty calls per
minute, and fueled by the explosion in the number of cellular subscribers,
an exponentially increasing number of these calls are placed from wireless
phones. 
2
Although the public's reliance on cellular phones in emergencies is
expanding, "Congress found that, despite the important steps taken by the
Commission, few areas in the country were served by wireless systems
operating under our E911 requirements and that E911 service currently is•
not deployed on many wireless systems." 26 In 1996, the FCC adopted rules
in a Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
18. 1996 FCC Report, supra note 16, para. 3.
19. Id. para. 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Commissioner Gloria Tristani, Address at the Association of Pub. Safety Comm.
Officials-Int'l (Aug. 14, 2000) available at http://www.fcc.gov/SpeechesITristani/2000/
spgt01O.html) [hereinafter Tristani's Address]; 1996 FCC Report, supra note 16, para 7; see
also H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 7-8 (1999).
23. 145 CONG. REc. H728, 732 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement of Rep. Green).
24. Id.; Tristani's Address, supra note 22; Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The
Government Knows Where You Are. Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the
Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 103, 104 (1998).
25. Tristani's Address, supra note 22; Werdegar, supra note 24, at 104; 1996 FCC
Report, supra note 16, par. 6.
26. 911 Act Report & Order, supra note 12, para. 6.
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required wireless carriers to deliver their customers' 911 calls to PSAPs
and obligated them to implement and deploy enhanced 911 features that
report the location of wireless emergency calls.27
The Commission scheduled its E-911 requirements to occur in two
phases.28 Phase One obligated carriers to transmit the phone number of the
wireless handset making the call and the location of the phone's cellular
base station to the designated PSAP. 9 Phase Two requires more precise
location technology; certain wireless carriers must achieve the capability to
identify the latitude and longitude of the wireless phone making the call.3
Without a doubt, wireless E-911 will allow emergency workers to reach
thousands of cellular callers more quickly and will save thousands of lives
in the process.3 Nonetheless, wireless corporations have delayed in
comporting with the Commission's requirements and have requested that
32the FCC relax the scheduled dates for compliance.
Congress accordingly passed the 911 Act to establish 911 as the
official, universal emergency number for wireline and wireless telephone
service. Additionally, the Act would spur lagging E-911 implementation
and beget the nationwide improvements in wireless emergency
communication systems mandated by the Commission's E-91 1
Requirements."
27. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 17442,
para. 7, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 3 (2000) [hereinafter E-911 Fourth Memorandum].
28. Id. para. 7. Covered carriers were required to comply with Phase I by April 1, 1998,
or within six months of a request by the designated PSAP, whichever is later. Wireless
carriers are required to provide Automatic Location Identification (ALI) as part of Phase II
E-911 implementation beginning October 1, 2001. Fact Sheet, FCC Wireless 911
Requirements, at http:llwww.fcc.gov/e91 l/factsheetrequirements_012001.txt (Jan. 2001).
29. E-911 Fourth Memorandum, supra note 27, para. 7.
30. Id.
31. ComCARE Alliance, A Need For Automatic Crash Notification: Actual Stories, at
http://www.comcare.org/research/news/stories.html (2001). Tragedies such as the following
may be averted. In 1998, a Florida woman who called 911 on her cell phone after being shot
under a bridge overpass, passed out before she could relay her location to the operator.
Seven hours later, emergency workers arrived and found her dead-six minutes away from
the nearest hospital. The medical examiners performing her autopsy said she probably
survived an additional two hours after placing her call to 911. Had wireless E-911
technology been in place, she might have survived.
32. E-911 Fourth Memorandum, supra note 27, para. 13; Tristani's Address, supra note
22.
33. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 7-8; 911 Act Report & Order, supra note 12, para. 6.
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IH. THE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC SAFETY
ACT OF 1999: A PROMISE TO PROMOTE AND ENHANCE PUBLIC
SAFETY
Designed to promote public safety "by making 9-1-1 the universal
emergency assistance number, by furthering deployment of wireless 9-1-1
capabilities and related functions, and by encouraging construction and
operation of seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable networks for wireless
services, 34 the 911 Act has four principal directives. First, it replaces the
confusing codes and alternative numbers that wireless networks previously
used by instructing the Commission to designate 911 as the universal
emergency number for all forms of telephone service.35 Second, the Act
charges the FCC with the task of supporting the states in implementing a
comprehensive end-to-end emergency communications network and
working with the states to administer wireless E-91 1.36 Third, it equalizes
the liability protection from transmission errors or other technical failures
that a given state confers upon wireless telecommunications users and
providers of 911 with that of wireline users and providers.37 Fourth, the 911
Act protects wireless users' privacy by requiring carriers to obtain a
customer's express prior authorization before disclosing any location
38information other than in emergencies.
The Act consists of six sections, the first of which simply identifies its
short title as the "Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of
1999" and the last of which merely provides definitions for the words and
phrases Congress employed in the legislation.39 The true substance of the
911 Act is contained in sections two through five. This analysis begins with
the former, which contains both Congress's findings and the stated purpose
of the law.40
A. Section Two-Assigning a Purpose
Section two of the 911 Act illustrates the general "importance of
establishing and maintaining an end-to-end communications infrastructure
34. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 1; Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999).
35. 145 CONG. REc. H728, 729-30 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin);
145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9862 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ford).
36. 145 CONG. REc. H728, 729-30 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
37. Id.; S. REP. No. 106-138, at 3.
38. 145 CONG. REc. H728, 729-30 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin);
145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9861 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. V 1999); 47 U.S.C. § 615(b) (Supp. V 1999).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 615 note (Supp. V 1999).
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• ,,41for emergency services. Congress highlighted six particular factual
findings as the cornerstone for its passage of the 911 Act, beginning with
its determination that an end-to-end emergency communications
infrastructure would reduce emergency response times and thus save both
thousands of lives and billions of dollars in health care costs.42 To
accomplish these objectives and to deploy this emergency
telecommunications service swiftly, Congress found that it was necessary
to encourage statewide coordination among emergency service providers,
establish funds for technology development and deployment, integrate
emergency communications with traffic control and management systems,
and charge the FCC with designating 911 as the nation's official
emergency number.43
Congress's findings also presented several collateral factors that
influenced its decision to pass this legislation. Prominent among these
factors was the importance of emerging technologies, such as E-9 11, in
reducing emergency response times and providing appropriate care,
meeting public health objectives of various government groups, and
realizing the improvement in emergency care systems that would result
from the "prompt notification of emergency services when motor vehicle
crashes occur .... 44Advancing new technology is central to the 911 Act's
purpose. The House Committee on Commerce found that encouraging
investment in emergency communications systems was important in
equipping states and localities to address public safety challenges.45
In concurrence with these findings, Congress pronounced that it
enacted the 911 Act "to encourage and facilitate the prompt deployment
throughout the United States of a seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable end-to-
end infrastructure for communications, including wireless communications,
to meet the Nation's public safety and other communications needs." 6 The
convoluted language of the Act's official purpose belies its legislative
intent. Simply put, Congress passed the 911 Act to establish one important
rule: any person should be able to dial 911 and receive assistance, no
matter where he or she is in America.47
41. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 5.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 615 note (Supp. V 1999).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 8 (1999).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 615 note (Supp. V 1999). "End-to-end" refers to "the integration of
wireless telecommunications services, intelligent highway systems including automatic
crash notification technology, and PSAP services." H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 14.
47. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9859 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
Rep. Tauzin's original language was a little more colorful: "The rule in America ought to be
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B. Section Three-Establishing a Universal Emergency Service
Number
The 911 Act's third section adds two provisions to the United States
Code.4 8 The first calls on the FCC to establish 911 as the nation's universal
emergency telephone number by amending the portion of the
Communications Act of 1934 that grants the FCC the authority and
jurisdiction to administer telecommunications numbering in the United
States.49 The second requires the FCC to play a more assertive role in
encouraging and supporting individual state efforts to deploy
comprehensive emergency communications infrastructure and programs,
including wireless E-911 service, by adding § 615 to Title 47.50
simple. If one is on a highway, a byway, bike path or a duck blind in Louisiana where
someone calls 9-1-1, they ought to get help. S. 800 will provide that help...." Id
48. 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999) (establishing October 26, 1999 as the date of
enactment of the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999); 47 U.S.C. §
615 (Supp. V 1999).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999). The full text of the paragraph added to §
25 1(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 reads as follows:
(3) Universal emergency telephone number
The Commission and any agency or entity to which the Commission has delegated
authority under this subsection shall designate 9-1-1 as the universal emergency
telephone number within the United States for reporting an emergency to
appropriate authorities and requesting assistance. The designation shall apply to
both wireline and wireless telephone service. In making the designation, the
Commission (and any such agency or entity) shall provide appropriate transition
periods for areas in which 9-1-1 is not in use as an emergency telephone number
on October 26, 1999.
Id.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 615 (Supp. V 1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 7. The full text of the
new § 615 added to Title 47 reads as follows:
Support for universal emergency telephone number
The Federal Communications Commission shall encourage and support efforts by
States to deploy comprehensive end-to-end emergency communications
infrastructure and programs, based on coordinated statewide plans, including
seamless, ubiquitous, reliable wireless telecommunications networks and
enhanced wireless 9-1-1 service. In encouraging and supporting that deployment,
the Commission shall consult and cooperate with State and local officials
responsible for emergency services and public safety, the telecommunications
industry (specifically including the cellular and other wireless telecommunications
service providers), the motor vehicle manufacturing industry, emergency medical
service providers and emergency dispatch providers, transportation officials,
special 9-1-1 districts, public safety, fire service and law enforcement officials,
consumer groups, and hospital emergency and trauma care personnel (including
emergency physicians, trauma surgeons, and nurses). The Commission shall
encourage each State to develop and implement coordinated statewide deployment
plans, through an entity designated by the governor, and to include representatives
of the foregoing organizations and entities in development and implementation of
such plans. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require the
Commission to impose obligations or costs on any person.
Number 1]
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When taken together, these two provisions are meant to ensure that all
American jurisdictions can "offer seamless networks for prompt emergency
service. By requiring the FCC to exert its exclusive numbering authority
and designate 911 as "the universal emergency telephone number...
within the United States for reporting an emergency to appropriate
authorities and [for] requesting assistance,"52 the Senate Committee on
Commerce recognized that the 911 Act was asking many PSAPs to make
technological changes that they could not afford to carry out immediately. 3
Thus, in areas where 911 was not in use as an emergency number on the
date of the Act's enactment, Congress directed the FCC to furnish entities
and localities with appropriate transition periods and to work with state and
local officials in developing coordinated statewide implementation plans.54
Realizing that cooperation between the private sector and state and
local governments would ease the transition to a national 911 system,
Congress suggested that the FCC generate statewide deployment
procedures through entities designated by state governors that include both
emergency service providers and representatives from the
telecommunications and automotive industries. 5 To make such plans
effective, the Commerce Committee suggested the governor-designated
entities include all parties affected by the 911 Act.
56
C. Section Four-Equalizing Liability for Wireless and Wireline
Service Providers
Section four gives to wireless carriers the same immunity or
protection from liability for transmission errors and other technical failures
enjoyed by wireline carriers by adding § 615a to the United States Code.57
47 U.S.C. § 615 (Supp. V 1999).
51. 911 Act Report & Order, supra note 12, para. 1.
52. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 12; 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999).
53. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999); S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6.
55. 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999); S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6.
56. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6.
57. 47 U.S.C. § 615a (a)-(d) (Supp. V 1999). The 911 Act adds § 615a to Title 47 of the
U.S. Code. The full text of this addition provides:
(a) Provider parity
A wireless carrier, and its officers, directors, employees, vendors, and agents,
shall have immunity or other protection from liability in a State of a scope and
extent that is not less than the scope and extent of immunity or other protection
from liability that any local exchange company, and its officers, directors,
employees, vendors, or agents, have under Federal and State law (whether through
statute, judicial decision, tariffs filed by such local exchange company, or
otherwise) applicable in such State, including in connection with an act or
omission involving the release to a PSAP, emergency medical service provider or
[Vol. 54
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This section extends liability parity to wireless carriers for both 911 and
non-911 calls and obviates the need for any carrier to "file tariffs, or take
other affirmative action to secure equivalent liability protection." '58 The
section also preempts any state law that establishes a different standard of
liability for wireless and wireline users and providers.
Acknowledging wireless companies' concerns about their potential
exposure to lawsuits for trying to improve the safety of their systems and
citing the "compelling case" made by wireless providers showing how
liability parity would enhance public safety, Congress included this
protection to ensure that "wireless technology develops and matures to
provide greater services."60 Section four only extends the current liability
protection from transmission errors or other technical failures that exist for
wireline carriers to wireless carriers; the bill was not intended to grant
wireless providers greater protection or to alter the rules for land lines.6'
Liability parity exists to facilitate the deployment of wireless 911
technology by preserving the existence of a competitive market and by
removing the possibility that a community might not have 911 service
62because of a wireless corporation's litigation fears.
emergency dispatch provider, public safety, fire service or law enforcement
official, or hospital emergency or trauma care facility of subscriber information
related to emergency calls or emergency services.
(b) User parity
A person using wireless 9-1-1 service shall have immunity or other protection
from liability of a scope and extent that is not less than the scope and extent of
immunity or other protection from liability under applicable law in similar
circumstances of a person using 9-1-1 service that is not wireless.
(c) PSAP parity
In matters related to wireless 9-1-1 communications, a PSAP, and its employees,
vendors, agents, and authorizing government entity (if any) shall have immunity
or other protection from liability of a scope and extent that is not less than the
scope and extent of immunity or other protection from liability under applicable
law accorded to such PSAP, employees, vendors, agents, and authorizing
government entity, respectively, in matters related to 9-1-1 communications that
are not wireless.
(d) Basis for enactment
This section is enacted as an exercise of the enforcement power of the Congress
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the power
of the Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, and with Indian tribes.
Id.
58. Id.; S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6.
59. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 3.
60. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9863 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Bliley);
Id. at 9859 (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
61. Id. at 9859 (statement of Rep. Tauzin); S. RP. No. 106-138, at 6.
62. 145 CONG. Rc. H9858, 9863 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Bliley);
S. REP. No. 106-138, at 6; 145 CONG. RIc. H728, 730 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1999) (statement
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Enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection and as an exercise of Congress's commerce power,63 this portion
of the 911 Act also provides PSAPs with the same immunity or protection
from liability that their wireline counterparts enjoy with respect to 911
calls. 64
D. Section Five-Requiring E-911 Capability and Protecting
User's Privacy
The last substantive provision of the 911 Act is section five, which
requires wireless providers to transmit call location information and
bolsters personal privacy by making three notable amendments to section
222 of the Communications Act of 1934-the provision concerning the
65privacy of customer information. Most importantly, in terms of the 911
Act's efforts to bring wireless emergency communication systems in line
with the Commission's E-911 requirements, this legislation first adds §
222(g) to address the problem of emergency service personnel not
receiving information indicating the phone number or location of callers
66who dial 911 from a wireless phone. The 911 Act's section five mandates
that a telecommunications carrier providing telephone exchange service
furnish subscribers' information to providers of emergency services,
thereby enhancing the ability of emergency service personnel to locate andS 67
respond to wireless phone calls for assistance.
of Rep. Tauzin).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 615a(d) (Supp. V 1999).
64. Id. § 615a(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1999).
65. 911 Act, sec. 5, 113 Stat. 1286, 1288 (codified generally throughout 47 U.S.C. §
222 (Supp. V 1999)); 145 CONG. REC. H9858, 9860 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of
Rep. Markey); S. REP. No. 106-138, at 7.
66. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 8; 47 U.S.C. § 222(g) (Supp. V 1999). The full text of the
amendment:
(g) Subscriber listed and unlisted information for emergency services
Notwithstanding subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, a telecommunications
carrier that provides telephone exchange service shall provide information
described in subsection (i)(3)(A) (including information pertaining to subscribers
whose information is unlisted or unpublished) that is in its possession or control
(including information pertaining to subscribers of other carriers) on a timely and
unbundled basis, under nondiscriminatory and reasonable rates, terms, and
conditions to providers of emergency services, and providers of emergency
support services, solely for purposes of delivering or assisting in the delivery of
emergency services.
Id.
67. S. REP. No. 106-138, at 8. At the time the 911 Act was passed, only six to seven
percent of wireless subscribers lived in regions where PSAPs had been upgraded to accept




Second, to allow carriers to release this information, section five
modifies the exceptions to the general rule contained in the
Communications Act of 1934 that telecommunications carriers have a duty
• • 68
to protect the confidentiality of customers' proprietary information. As
amended, § 222 now states that nothing prohibits a telecommunications
carrier from using proprietary network information obtained from its
customers to provide call location information to either emergency service
providers, members of the user's immediate family, or database
management services.
The third and final amendment to § 222 includes provisions to protect
• 70
personal privacy. Incorporated in the 911 Act with the knowledge that the
location of all wireless phones will eventually be traceable, section five
declares that unless it is an emergency or unless a customer expressly
authorizes a disclosure of call location information, no person has the
authority to use wireless location information. 7' This final amendment, an
opt-in for consumer privacy, limits the disclosure of location information to
• * 72
specific instances.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(4) (Supp. V 1999). The full text of the 911 Act amendment:
(4) to provide call location information concerning the user of a commercial
mobile service (as such term is defined in section 332(d) of this title)--
(A) to a public safety answering point, emergency medical service provider
or emergency dispatch provider, public safety, fire service, or law
enforcement official, or hospital emergency or trauma care facility, in order
to respond to the user's call for emergency services;
(B) to inform the user's legal guardian or members of the user's immediate
family of the user's location in an emergency situation that involves the risk
of death or serious physical harm; or
(C) to providers of information or database management services solely for
purposes of assisting in the delivery of emergency services in response to an
emergency.
Id.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 222(d) (Supp. V 1999).
70. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9860 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey).
71. 47 U.S.C. § 222(t) (Supp. V 1999); 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9862 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ford). The full text of the 911 Act amendment reads:
(f) Authority to use wireless location information
For purposes of subsection (c)(1) of this section, without the express prior
authorization of the customer, a customer shall not be considered to have
approved the use or disclosure of or access to--
(1) call location information concerning the user of a commercial mobile service
(as such term is defined in section 332(d) of this title), other than in accordance
with subsection (d)(4) of this section; or
(2) automatic crash notification information to any person other than for use in the
operation of an automatic crash notification system.
47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (Supp. V 1999).
72. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9860 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey);
145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9862 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ford).
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E. The 911 Act's Fiscal Impact-Estimating the Legislation's
Costs
The Congressional Budget Office ("the CBO") estimated that the 911
Act would cost less than $500,000 for the federal government to execute
and would have no significant impact on the federal budget.73 The CBO
also estimated that the 911 Act would not impose any significant costs on
74
state, local, or tribal governments. While the Act's impact on
governmental budgets might be slight, it does "impose a new private-sector
mandate on local phone companies and wireless carriers that provide
telephone exchange service. ' '7' Because these companies are the entities
required to provide subscriber identification information to providers of
911 emergency services and to providers of certain emergency support
services, the CBO calculated that the 911 Act would require local phone
companies and wireless carriers to spend less than $100 million.76 The
CBO estimate does not mention the costs of improving infrastructure that
come along with providing the United States with a seamless 911 blanket
and the resulting costs that local phone companies and wireless carriers will
pass along to consumers.
IV. WHY THE 911 ACT CANNOT KEEP ITS PROMISE
An end-to-end communications infrastructure designed to reduce the
response time of emergency care providers could save thousands of lives,
save billions of dollars in health care costs, and furnish every American
with the possibility of receiving assistance from any telephone by simply
dialing 911. Nonetheless, before the 911 Act can fulfill its promise to
promote and enhance public safety, Congress and the FCC must first
address the Act's defects, the most prominent of which are neglecting to
mandate the implementation of 911 service, providing liability parity to
wireless providers equivalent to that already bestowed upon wireline
service providers for omissions and technical failures, and excluding the
issue of cellular tower siting.
A. The Act Does Not Compel Any Entity to Establish 911 Service
Congress did not require the FCC to force any state, locality, or
telecommunications provider to establish an emergency service system
where 911 was not currently in operation. Rather, it only instructed the






FCC to encourage 911 deployment.77 Although section three is dedicated to
fulfilling the promise of "seamless, ubiquitous, reliable wireless
telecommunications networks and enhanced wireless 9-1-1 service,
' 78
Congress contradicted all of its provisions, calling for the FCC to aid state
compliance with the deployment of nationwide 911 service by stipulating
that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize or require
the Commission to impose obligations or costs on any person. ' 79 The
Commission interpreted this statement literally and concluded that, under
the 911 Act, it cannot compel a state or locality to establish 911 service or
obligate a wireless carrier to transmit 911 calls to any local agency if state
and local authorities have not established a PSAP.80
Therefore, the FCC only complied with those portions of the Act
requiring it to establish 911 as the universal emergency services number
within the United States and has not yet discharged the remainder of its
section three requirements.8' Obligated to establish appropriate transition
periods for areas in which 911 is not currently used as an emergency
number and to help states deploy the comprehensive emergency
communications systems demanded by the Act, the Commission has only
sought comment on how to proceed, tentatively concluding that without
imposing either costs or obligations or interfering with the balance of
responsibilities, it could advance universal 911 service "through guidelines,
fact sheets, meetings, or other information-sharing measures .... [such as]
perform[ing] the function of a 'clearinghouse' .82
Nothing in the legislative history indicates why the Senate drafters
inserted the clause stating that the 911 Act does not authorize or require the
FCC to impose obligations or costs on any entity. The House version
included no such language; that bill intended the Commission to require
wireless and wireline carriers to offer 911 to their subscribers, suggesting
that it "choose to determine that a requirement on the carriers to offer 911
service... would serve the public interest .... [and] thereby permit a user
in any location in the United States to dial 911 ... and be connected to the
local PSAP." 3 As opposed to its Senate counterpart, the House version of
the Act would have put 911 into effect where it did not currently exist and
would have promoted public safety by endowing the United States with a
77. 47 U.S.C. § 615 (Supp. V 1999).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 911 Act Report & Order, supra note 12, para 11; 911 Act Proposed Rules, supra
note 15, para. 8.
81. 911 Act Report & Order, supra note 12, para. 2.
82. Id. at 17081, 17088-89.
83. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 13.
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seamless 911 blanket in the process.
While not specified in its reports or hearings, the most probable
reason for the Senate's reluctance to require the FCC to impose costs or
obligations was fear of a reprisal of the debate that raged around the
Commission's rules requiring a cost recovery mechanism to be in place
before a wireless carrier was obligated to provide E-911 service. The
wireless industry asserted that the cost recovery prerequisite caused delays
in the deployment of E-911 Phase I, and the FCC agreed-it eventually
84removed the cost recovery requirement. Perhaps to simplify the 911 Act's
execution and to preempt and avoid similar difficulties, the Senate drafters
removed any chance that the Commission's imposition of costs or
obligations might delay the wireless industry's compliance with the Act.
Regrettably, those drafters might also have synchronously removed
any possibility that the 911 Act would fulfill its vision of a ubiquitous
emergency communications network. A clearinghouse cannot directly
benefit public safety. Measures like the 911 Act will not live up to their
billed purpose unless Congress commands their nationwide application,
and the 911 Act cannot live up to its promise of saving lives and meeting
the nation's public safety needs without saddling providers and
municipalities with some costs or obligations.
Some might argue that, instead of directly interfering with the
statute's goals, the fact that the 911 Act does not impose costs or
obligations on any party makes it advantageous for smaller communities
because it does not force expenditures on those localities who cannot afford
to develop 911 service. This reasoning overlooks the fact that private sector
corporations and their consumers, who pay a small fee on each monthly bill
for the service, bear most of the direct costs of 911-not localities and
municipalities. Apart from establishing a PSAP, municipalities would not
have made any substantial expenditures because providers and subscribers
essentially fund the service. While not forcing a local governmental body
to invest any money in a seamless 911 service might be expedient for a
smaller community's tax base, no community, not even those on the
smaller side, can benefit from a 911 service that does not exist.
Besides the fact that the 911 Act does not require any entity to
establish 911 in areas without service, the Act's liability parity provisions
are another source of weakness.
84. Revision of the Comm'ns Rules To Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Sys., Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 20850,
paras. 1, 2, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1077 (1999).
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B. The Act's Liability Parity Provisions Give Too Much Away to
the Wireless Industry
"Consumer advocates, public-safety groups and the
[telecommunications] industry all welcomed the national emergency
815
number;" still, not everyone was pleased at the Act's passage. Some
critics labeled it a "sucker punch to consumer rights," because Congress
passed the Senate's version of the 911 Act in lieu of an earlier House bill
that would have allowed states to enact separate protections against
transmission errors or other technical failures committed by wireless1186
providers. As enacted, however, the 911 Act bars states from awarding
monetary consequential damages of their own and provides wireless
carriers the same liability protection that individual states provide wireline
carriers, both of which are stipulations that the Wireless Consumers
Alliance has labeled as an attempt by the industry to assemble total
immunity.87 In essence, the liability provisions of the 911 Act favor the
wireless industry by equating wireless providers with unaccountable public
utilities, depriving individual states the ability to establish separate, unique
wireless 911 liability laws on their own,88 and failing to address the current
89inconsistencies in state 911 liability laws.
Such criticism of the 911 Act's liability provisions is countered with a
simple economics argument: these "protections are necessary to help
85. Holt, supra note 11, at 12.
86. Chuck Holt, E-911 Rumbles Through 4Q99, WIRELESS REV., Jan. 1, 2000, at 10
[hereinafter E-911 Rumbles]. The House 911 Act, H.R. 438, included the following clause:
(c) Exception for state legislative action
The immunity or other protection from liability required by subsection (a)(1) shall
not apply in any State that, prior to the expiration of 2 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, enacts a statute that specifically refers to this section and
establishes a different standard of immunity or other protection from liability with
respect to an act or omission involving development, design, installation,
operation, maintenance, performance, or provision of wireless service (other than
wireless 911 service). The enactment of such a State statute shall not affect the
immunity or other protection from liability required by such subsection (a)(1) with
respect to acts or omissions occurring before the date of enactment of such State
statute.
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, H.R. 438, 106th Cong. § 4(c)
(1999).
87. Holt, supra note 11, at 12; E-911 Rumbles, supra note 86, at 10. See 47 U.S.C. §
615a (a)-(d) (Supp. V 1999).
88. Michele C. Farquhar, Developments in Wireless Telecommunications Policy and
Regulation: A Review of the Past Year and Insights into the Year Ahead, in 17th Annual
Institute on Telecomm. Policy & Regulation 73, 91 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-0089, 1999).
89. See William J. Sill & Heidi C. Pearlman, When Parity Is Inadequate, WIRELESS
REv., June 1, 1999, at 56.
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ensure that the wireless technology develops and matures to provide greater
services" because wireless companies are stalling the deployment of
location technology out of liability and litigation concerns.90 Claiming that
monetary judgments from state courts might force carriers to raise
consumer rates, the wireless industry asserted that liability parity would not
only expedite the deployment of wireless 911 technology but also hinder
rate increases.9' Congress found this reasoning compelling; the House
Committee on Commerce reported that extending protection from liability
to wireless carriers "[would] facilitate filling in ... dead zones [in wireless
coverage] and the provision of emergency wireless services, thereby
enhancing public safety.
'92
Yet, before Congress passed the 911 Act, the FCC was reluctant to
displace the jurisdiction of state courts over tort suits for wireless carriers'
negligence and was "unable to find that [a] general exemption from
liability [was] essential to achieving the goals of the Communications
Act."93 Noting that provisions contained in state-filed tariffs define local
exchange carrier immunity, the FCC was not persuaded by the argument
that it "should provide wireless carriers the same broad immunity from
liability that is available to landline local exchange carriers. Congress
then passed the 911 Act and did just that at the behest of the wireless
industry.95 Now endowed with the same level of protection accorded to
wireline carriers as public utilities, wireless providers are nearly
unaccountable for service failures. For example, the Indiana Bell
Telephone Company's tariff filed with the Indiana Utility Regulatory
90. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9859 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin);
145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9863 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Bliley). Indeed, a
spokesman for the 911 Act's sponsor, Rep. Bums, stated that "[w]ithout liability parity,
there is no incentive for cellular providers to offer comprehensive wireless E-911 service."
E-911 Wireless Liability Protection Bill Heads for White House, 9 GLOBAL POSMIONING &
NAVIGATION NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com.
91. Holt, supra note 11, at 12.
92. H.R REP. No. 106-25, at 4-5 (1999).
93. 1996 FCC Report, supra note 16, at para. 100.
94. Id. at para. 99. The Commission also stated that, instead of providing blanket
liability protection:
E-911 wireless carriers wish[ing] to protect themselves from liability for
negligence [could] attempt to bind customers to contractual language, require
public safety organizations to hold them harmless for liability ... or, if the
liability is caused by the rulings of the Commission, argue that the actions
complained of were caused by acts of public authority.
Id
95. See 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9863 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Bliley) ("Wireless carriers have made a compelling case as to why liability parity is justified
in this limited instance and how public safety will be enhanced if it is enacted."); 47 U.S.C.
§ 615a (a)-(d) (Supp. V 1999).
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Commission caps the company's damages for any claim, other than for
willful misconduct, at "the proportionate part of the monthly recurring
charge for the service for the period during which the service was
affected." 96 The 911 Act accords wireless carriers operating in Indiana this
same level of protection-even if their technologically new service may
not be as proven and reliable as their wireline counterparts..
The Act also removes a particular state's ability to enact new wireless
911 liability laws of its own.97 Both the Senate and the House developed
911 legislation during the 106th Congress, but the two versions differed in
respect to the liability parity provisions." While the House bill would have
bestowed protection from liability to wireless providers equal to that which
local wireline carriers received in any given state, subject to a two-year
period during which a state could choose to legislate a separate wireless
liability statute, the liability protection provisions of the enacted 911 Act
are self-executing and immediate. 99 By usurping a state's opportunity to
hold wireless providers to a different liability standard, the Senate's 911
Act may have just helped the industry in assembling total immunity and
"sucker punched" consumer rights in the process.
The final flaw of the 911 Act's liability parity provisions is that they
fail to address the inconsistencies in state 911 liability law.01 Most states
have indemnification clauses protecting emergency service providers from
liability for transmission errors or other technical failures10 2 similar to that
96. Tariff of Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., pt. 2, sec. 2, at 2, available at http:ll
wwwl.ameritech.com/corporate/regulatory/indiana/in200202.pdf. (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
97. Farquhar, supra note 88, at 91.
98. See E-911 Rumbles, supra note 86, at 10; 47 U.S.C. § 615a (a)-(d) (Supp. V 1999).
99. See E-911 Rumbles, supra note 86, at 10; 911 Act Report and Order, supra note 12,
at para. 7. The other main difference between the two versions is that the House bill makes
no mention of PSAPs while the 911 Act offers PSAPs engaging in wireless 911 service the
same protection from liability that wireline PSAPs enjoy. See 47 U.S.C. § 615a (a)-(d)
(Supp. V 1999); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 3 (1999).
100. Holt, supra note 11, at 12; E-911 Rumbles, supra note 86, at 10.
101. See Sill & Pearlman, supra note 89, at 56.
102. See generally ALA. CODE § 11-9-89 (Supp. 2000) (willful or wanton misconduct);
ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.133(a) (Michie 2000) (intentional acts of misconduct or gross
negligence); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-713(A) (West Supp. 2001) (acted knowingly or
failure to act created unreasonable risk of bodily injury with a high probability that
substantial harm would result); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-10-317(a)(3) (Michie 1999) (not
liable for any failure of equipment or procedure); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-11-105
(West Supp. 2001) (intentionally caused by or resulted from gross negligence); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 28-30(g) (West Supp. 2001) (wanton, reckless or malicious); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 365.171(14) (West Supp. 2001) (acting with malicious purpose or in a wanton and
willful manner); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-135 (1992) (willful or wanton misconduct); IDAHO
CODE § 31-4812(2) (Michie 1994) (act with malice or criminal intent, or commit reckless,
willful and wanton conduct); 50 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 750/15.1 (West Supp. 2001)
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enacted by the Indiana legislature.
Notwithstanding any other law, the board, a PSAP, political
subdivision, CMRS provider, local exchange company, or an
employee, director, officer, or agent of a PSAP, political subdivision,
CMRS provider, or local exchange company is not liable for damages
in a civil action or subject to criminal prosecution resulting from death,
injury, or loss to persons or property incurred by any person in
connection with establishing, developing, implementing, maintaining,
operating, and providing wireless 911 service in compliance with the
requirements established by the FCC order and rules adopted under the
FCC order, except in the case of willful or wanton misconduct.
°0 3
As is the case with Indiana, most states allow civil damage suits and
criminal prosecutions against 911 providers for willful or wanton
misconduct.
(willful or wanton misconduct); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-16.5-46 (West Supp. 2000)(willful or wanton misconduct); IOWA CODE ANN. § 34A.7(6) (West 1995) (willful and
wanton negligence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-5308 (Supp. 2000) (shall not be liable for any
form of damages resulting from total or partial failure of any transmission); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 65.7637 (Michie Supp. 2000) (negligence, or wanton or willful misconduct, or bad
faith); 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 507 (H.B. 436) (West) (willful or wanton misconduct
or gross negligence); MD. CODE ANN., [911 Service Carriers] § 18-106(b) (Supp. 2000)(nothing in this subtitle shall be interpreted to extend any liability to a 911 carrier); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.1604 (West Supp. 2001) (a criminal act or gross negligence or
willful and wanton misconduct); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 403.14 (West Supp. 2001) (willful or
wanton misconduct); 2001 Miss. Laws Ch. 569, H.B. 469(10) (entitled to receive the
limitations of liability as provided to the state, or any agency or local government of the
state); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 190.307(1) (West Supp. 2001) (willful and wanton misconduct or
gross negligence); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-1009 (Michie 1999) (failure to use
reasonable care or for intentional acts); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 707.500(l)(c) (Michie Supp.
1999) (good faith); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17C-10(d) (West 2001) (malicious purpose or a
wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons or property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62A-
31 (2000) (wanton or willful misconduct); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4931.49(C) (Anderson
Supp. 2000) (no liability for telephone company or installer); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
2817(B) (West Supp. 2001) (gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct); OR.
REv. STAT. § 401.515(1) (1999) (willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7021.1 (West Supp. 2001) (local governmental immunity); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 39-21.1-1(b)(10) (1997) (willful or wanton acts of misconduct); S.C. CODE ANN. §
23-47-70(C) (West Supp. 2000) (reckless, willful, or wanton conduct); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-45-17 (Michie 1994) (willful or wanton negligence or intentional acts); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 7-86-319 (1998) (duty no greater than non-commercial mobile radio service
provider); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 771.053(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (gross
negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct); UTAH CODE ANN. § 69-2-8(2) (2000)
(intentionally caused by or resulting from gross negligence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 7060(2000) (gross negligence or an intentional tort); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-484.18(B) (Michie
Supp. 2001) (gross negligence or willful misconduct); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
38.52.550(2) (West Supp. 2001) (gross negligence or wanton or willful misconduct); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-8 (Michie 1999) (willful or wanton misconduct); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.70(7) (West Supp. 2000) (no liability to any person who uses an emergency number
system).
103. IND. CODEANN. § 36-8-16.5-46 (West Supp. 2000).
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Nonetheless, several important differences exist among the fifty
states. Kentucky and Oregon, for example, add "bad faith" to the list of
conduct that removes a provider's immunity from liability.14 Colorado,
Michigan, and Missouri are among several states allowing for the
imposition of liability upon a showing of "gross negligence."'0 5 Nebraska
law imposes liability if an emergency provider simply fails to use
"reasonable care" and states such as South Carolina and Texas only require
106
"recklessness" before a court could impose liability. Finally, some states,
such as Arkansas and Wisconsin, provide blanket protection from liability
without exception for emergency service providers while others, like
Maine, expressly provide for the civil liability of wireless carriers: a
telecommunications provider assisting in the implementation and operation
of the statewide E-911 system in that state is subject to tort liability
resulting from any defect in the E-911 system caused by the
telecommunications provider's negligent, intentional, willful or reckless
acts or omissions.'0 7 Others, such as California, have no such statute.
All these different state liability provisions point to the complications
that might arise in developing a "nationwide, seamless, and ubiquitous"
emergency phone system. Conduct that could subject a wireless provider to
liability in one state is perfectly acceptable in another, and the 911 Act's
public safety improvements might therefore only occur in the states where
a provider is certain that liability can be avoided-states such as Arkansas
and Wisconsin that provide blanket protection from liability without
exception for emergency service providers.' Since the FCC cannot compel
a state or locality to establish 911 service if it is not currently used, and
cannot obligate a wireless carrier to transmit 911 calls to another local
agency if state and local authorities have not established a PSAP, it is likely
that 911 service in accordance with the 911 Act will occur in those states
where all concerned parties are assured of escaping liability. Citizens of
states with a lesser liability standard might remain in the 911 dark ages
104. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.7637 (Michie Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §
401.515(1) (1999).
105. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.133(a) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-11-
105 (West Supp. 2001); 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 507 (H.B. 436) (West); MICH. COMP.
LAWs. ANN. § 484.1604 (West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 190.307(1) (West Supp.
2001).
106. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-1009 (Michie 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-47-
70(C) (West Supp. 2000); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 771.053(a) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
107. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2930 (West Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE. ANN. §
12-10-317(a)(3) (Michie 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.70(7) (West Supp. 2000).
108. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-10-317(a)(3) (Michie 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.70(7) (West Supp. 2000).
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because wireless carriers in those states could be subject to "potentially
large judgments for acts or omissions in the provision of [wireless 911]
service .... 1,,09 Without a specific federal liability provision establishing a
nationwide norm for 911 provider liability, the bill probably will not have
the significant impact on public safety that Congress envisions.
Beyond legislating federal liability provisions, an argument can be
made for an amendment to the 911 Act abrogating immunity altogether for
any transmission errors or technical failures that might occur in the
provision of 911 service. While this argument is beyond the scope of this
Note and has also been addressed elsewhere, it proceeds from the opinions
of a few courts that have held a municipality liable for failures in furnishing
911 service."0 If municipalities can be held liable for failing to respond to a
911 call, private liability-for both wireline and wireless carriers-cannot
be too far a stretch. Customers fund 911 systems through monthly
surcharges, and since consumers are essentially purchasing 911 service, the
companies from which they purchase this service should be held to perform
their emergency services with reasonable care under the circumstances.
Although the liability protections for the wireless industry are among
the most contested of the 911 Act's provisions,"' the Act's silence on the
issue of the new wireless towers that will be needed to meet its mandates is
also a significant weakness.
C. The Act Fails to Address Tower Siting Issues
Two tower siting issues were dropped from the Act as a political
accommodation "[i]n order to get the bill through [Congress] and on to the
President's desk .... 2 Tower siting issues pose a nationwide problem
because wireless calls cannot be transmitted in many areas due to the
absence of a nearby cellular or personal communications services ("PCS")
antenna." 3 The House Committee on Commerce recognized that "[a]
wireless telephone is worthless unless the call goes through,""4 and hoped
that carriers would fill in the existing "holes" and "dead zones" in the
109. Sill & Pearlman, supra note 89, at 57.
110. See, e.g., DeLong v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983); Chambers-
Castanes v. King County, 669 P.2d 451 (Wash. 1983). See also Jeffrey D. Hickman, Note,
It's Time to Call 911 For Government Immunity, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1067 (1993);
Maas, supra note 13, at 105.
111. See Holt, supra note 11, at 12.
112. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9861 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
113. H.R. REp. No. 106-25, at 4 (1999); see also Malcolm J. Tuesley, Note, Not in My
Backyard: The Siting of Wireless Communications Facilities, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 887, 888-
89 (1999).
114. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 5 (1999).
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wireless network once they were provided protection from liability.1 5 This
wishful thinking does not provide any immediate solution to the problem;
the 911 Act's call for a "seamless, ubiquitous" wireless network requires
the FCC to implement a new dimension of wireless service but does not
provide for new towers, the necessary infrastructure. The 911 Act cannot
improve public safety if wireless 911 calls cannot be transmitted to a
PSAP. Moreover, an end-to-end web of emergency communications cannot
exist until Congress works to fill the existing holes and gaps in wireless
coverage.
Besides failing to provide the infrastructure needed to accomplish its
goals, the 911 Act's silence on the tower siting issue might invite litigation.
In the coming years, "courts may become the chief venue for resolving
tower-siting disputes"'1 6 and conflicts relating to the location of cellular and
PCS towers will only increase as more towers are brought online to meet
the needs of an exploding wireless consumer base and the demands of the
911 Act. Congress recognized the potential for fierce disagreement over
tower siting but chose not to address the topic, opting instead to remove it
from the bill "because it is still a very controversial question that has to do
with local jurisdictions and zoning .... Instead of issuing peremptory
commands in the 911 Act to cope with this issue, Congress chose, in effect,
to ignore the issue and leave it for courts to decide.
The final problem raised by the 911 Act's failure to treat tower siting
issues is the potential effect it might have on the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. The EMR Network, one of several public interest groups, fears
that the Act might undermine the planning and zoning rights reserved to
municipalities regarding the siting of telecommunications facilities." 8 That
group would have preferred that the 911 Act include language preserving
the rights accorded to municipalities under the Telecommunications Act of
1996." 9
V. CONCLUSION: How TO CONVERT THIS EMPTY PROMISE
INTO A GUARANTEE OF IMPROVED PUBLIC SAFETY
Although Congress endowed the 911 Act with commendable goals,
this legislation will not have the beneficial impact on American public
safety that its authors desire. Without specifically and affirmatively
115. Id.at4.
116. Farquhar, supra note 88, at 95.
117. 145 CONG. REc. H9858, 9861 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
118. Congress Passes, President Signs E-911 Bill, 7 ANDREws ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD
LMG. REP. 7 (1999).
119. Id.
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mandating the development of 911 emergency service systems in
jurisdictions where they are not in operation, the Act leaves open the
possibility that some areas may never receive emergency service. To be
genuinely effective, Congress should amend the Act by removing the
phrase stating that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to authorize
or require the Commission to impose obligations or costs on any person.
That clause barricades the 911 Act's success.
No important American public safety objective can be accomplished
without either a congressional fiscal commitment or a requirement that an
executive agency impose spending on third parties. In this competitive
corporate climate, it is conceivable that a wireless carrier might decide that,
in some areas, implementing 911 service is not worth the expense without a
congressional mandate. This possibility frustrates the 911 Act's goal of
allowing an individual to dial 911 and receive assistance from anywhere in
America. Congress should allow the FCC to impose costs and obligations
on the wireless industry, states, and municipalities.
Congress should also modify the Act's liability provisions. Instead of
providing liability protection equal to that already afforded by a specific
state and equating wireless carriers with unaccountable public utilities,
Congress should allow individual states to decide whether or not to hold
providers or PSAPs liable for breakdowns in 911 transmission. Moreover,
Congress should address the current inconsistencies in state liability
laws. 12 Without a consistent liability framework, the 911 Act cannot
provide a consistent emergency communication network. While the FCC
will not author a uniform liability standard, Congress does have the power
"to pass legislation that would provide a nationwide, uniform liability
limitation for wireless carriers.' 2
Finally, because additional infrastructure in terms of siting facilities is
necessary to implement this Act fully, Congress should provide specific
federal land to be used for wireless towers. While this topic is already
covered by a:
1995 Presidential memorandum directing Federal agencies to facilitate
the placement of wireless antennas on Federal property and section
704(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. 332 note),
which directs Federal agencies to make property available for the
placement of wireless antennas .... only the Postal Service and.., the
General Services Administration (GSA) have engaged in any kind of
concerted effort to make their properties available for antenna siting.-123
120. 47 U.S.C. § 615 (Supp. V 1999).
121. See Sill & Pearlman, supra note 89, at 57.
122. Id.
123. H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 5-6 (1999); see H.R. REP. No. 106-25, at 19-21 (1999)
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Specifying certain tracts of land as future wireless antenna sites would
not only improve wireless coverage, but it might also keep states,
municipalities, and private citizens from frustrating the goals of the 911
Act by refusing to allow the construction of wireless towers. The 911 Act
cannot save lives if 911 calls cannot be relayed to a PSAP because a
customer is outside a given service area, and Congress may have limited
the Act's impact by ignoring tower siting issues in this legislation.
With the 911 Act, Congress took an important first step. Establishing
911 as the nation's official emergency number and replacing the confusing
codes and alternative numbers that wireless networks previously used will
allow many Americans to receive emergency assistance instead of the
bewilderment they might previously have encountered. But Congress
intended the 911 Act to accomplish more than just making 911 the official
number where wireless service is already in effect. In order for the 911 Act
to live up to its promise of a seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable wireless
communication network, Congress should make three changes to the Act:
(1) authorize or require the Commission to impose obligations or costs on
wireless carriers, states, and municipalities; (2) modify the Act's liability
provisions; and (3) provide specific federal parcels of land to be used for
wireless towers. Until these changes are made, the 911 Act will remain a
Congressional empty promise of enhanced public safety.
(the National Park Service has also agreed to make an assessment of its policies of allowing
wireless antennas inside National Parks).
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